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Abstract—The key encapsulation mechanism EDON-K was
proposed in response to the call for post-quantum cryptography
standardization issued by the National Institute of Standards and
Technologies (NIST). This scheme is inspired by the McEliece
scheme but uses another family of codes defined over F2128
instead of F2 and is not based on the Hamming metric. It allows
significantly shorter public keys than the McEliece scheme.
In this paper, we give a polynomial time algorithm that
recovers the encapsulated secret. This attack makes the scheme
insecure for the intended use. We obtain this result by observing
that recovering the error in the McEliece scheme corresponding
to EDON-K can be viewed as a decoding problem for the rank-
metric. We show that the code used in EDON-K is in fact a
super-code of a Low Rank Parity Check (LRPC) code of very
small rank (1 or 2). A suitable parity-check matrix for the super-
code of such low rank can be easily derived from for the public
key. We then use this parity-check matrix in a decoding algorithm
that was devised for LRPC codes to recover the error. Finally
we explain how we decapsulate the secret once we have found
the error.
I. INTRODUCTION
The syndrome decoding problem is a fundamental prob-
lem in complexity theory, since the original paper of
Berlekamp, McEliece and van Tilborg [BMvT78] proving its
NP-completeness for the Hamming distance. The same year,
McEliece proposed a public-key cryptosystem based on this
problem [McE78] and instantiated it with binary Goppa codes.
This scheme was for a long time considered inferior to RSA
due to its large key size. However, this situation has changed
drastically when it became apparent in [Sho94] that RSA
and actually all the other public-key cryptosystems used in
practice could be attacked in polynomial time by a quantum
computer. There are now small prototypes of such computers
that lead to think that they will become a reality in the
future and in 2016, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) announced a call for standardization of
cryptosystems that would be safe against an adversary equiped
with a quantum computer. Four families of cryptosystems
are often mentioned as potential candidates: cryptosystems
based on error correcting codes, lattices, hash functions and
multivariate quadratic equations [BBD09]. All of these are
based on mathematical problems that are expected to remain
hard even in the presence of a quantum computer.
The key encapsulation mechanism EDON-K [GG17] was
proposed by Gligoroski and Gjøsteen in response to the call
issued by the NIST. This scheme is inspired by the McEliece
scheme but uses another family of codes defined over F2128
instead of F2. This choice leads to very short keys for a code-
based scheme. The metric used for the decoding is not properly
defined and the security relies on an ad-hoc problem named
finite field vector subset ratio problem supposedly hard on
average.
In this paper, we show that the metric used for EDON-K is
in fact equivalent to the well-known rank metric. This metric
was first introduced in 1951 as “arithmetic distance” between
matrices over a field Fq [Hua51]. The notion of rank distance
and rank codes over matrices was defined in 1978 by Delsarte
[Del78]. He introduced a code family, named maximum rank
distance (MRD) codes, that attains the analogue of the MDS
(maximum distance separable) bound for the rank metric.
Gabidulin suggests in [Gab85] to consider a subfamily of
such codes that are linear over an extension field Fqm . It
provides a vectorial representation of these codes and allows
to represent them in a much more compact way. This is the
main reason why the rank metric based McEliece schemes
achieve significantly smaller key sizes. Moreover this vectorial
representation allows to view the known families of MRD
codes as rank metric analogues of Reed-Solomon codes and
to obtain an efficient decoding algorithm for them [Gab85].
There are also rank metric analogues for other families of
codes. For instance, the Low Rank Parity-Check (LRPC) codes
introduced in [GMRZ13] can be considered as analogues
of Low Density Parity-Check (LDPC) codes. Just like their
binary cousins, they enjoy an efficient decoding algorithm that
is based on a low rank parity-check matrix of such a code.
Here, we prove that the code used in EDON-K is a actually
a super-code of an LRPC code of rank 2. What is more, this
LRPC code is itself a subspace of codimension 1 of another
LRPC code of rank 1. It turns out that parity-check matrices
of rank 2 for the first super-code and rank 1 for the second
one can easily be derived from the public key. In both cases,
this allows us to decode the ciphertext without the secret key.
This gives a way to recover the encapsulated secret and breaks
completely the EDON-K system.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we recall some
basic definitions and properties of rank metric and LRPC codes
in Section II. In Section III we present the scheme of EDON-K.
Then we explain the general idea of our attack in section IV. In
Section V, we detail how we reconstruct a parity-check matrix
of the code and in Section VI how we decode the ciphertext.
In Section VII, we explain how we derive the encapsulated
secret from the error. Finally in Section VIII we discuss the
cost of this attack and its consequences.
II. RANK METRIC CODES
A. Notation
In the following document, q denotes a power of a prime
number. In the case of EDON-K, we will have q = 2. Fq
denotes the finite field with q elements and, for any positive
integer m, Fqm denotes the finite field with q
m elements. We
will sometimes view Fqm as an m-dimensional vector space
over Fq .
We use bold lowercase and capital letters to denote vectors
and matrices respectively.
We denote 〈x1, . . . , xk〉K the K-vector space generated by
the elements {x1, . . . xk}.
B. Definitions
Definition 1 (Rank metric over Fnqm). Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
F
n
qm and (β1, . . . , βm) be a basis of Fqm viewed as an m-
dimensional vector space over Fq. Each coordinate xj ∈
Fqm is associated to a vector of F
m
q in this basis: xj =∑m
i=1 mi,jβi. The m × n matrix associated to x is given by
M(x) := (mi,j)1≤i≤m,1≤j≤n.
The rank weight wt(x) of x is defined as :
wt(x) := RankM(x).
The associated distance d(x,y) between elements x and y
of Fnqm is defined by d(x,y) := wt(x− y).
Definition 2 (Support of a word). Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
F
n
qm . The support of x, denoted Supp(x), is the Fq-subspace
of Fqm generated by the coordinates of x:
Supp(x) := 〈x1, . . . , xn〉Fq .
We have dim(Supp(x)) = wt(x).
Definition 3 (Fqm-linear code). An Fqm-linear code C of
dimension k and length n is a subspace of dimension k of
F
n
qm . C can be represented in two equivalent ways: by a
generator matrix G ∈ Fk×nqm such that C = {xG |x ∈ F
k
qm}
and by a parity-check matrix H ∈ F
(n−k)×n
qm such that
C = {x ∈ Fnqm |Hx
⊺ = 0n−k}.
The decoding problem in the rank metric can be described
as follows.
Problem 1 (Decoding problem for the rank metric). Let C
be an Fqm -linear code of dimension k and length n. Given
y = c + e where c ∈ C and e ∈ Fnqm is of rank weight ≤ r
find c and e.
C. LRPC codes
Definition 4 (LRPC code). A Low Rank Parity Check (LRPC)
code of rank d, length n and dimension k over Fqm is a code
that admits a parity-check matrix H = (hi,j) ∈ F
(n−k)×n
qm
such that the vector space of Fqm generated by its coefficients
hi,j has dimension at most d.
LRPC codes can be viewed as analogues of LDPC codes
for the rank metric. In particular, they enjoy an efficient
decoding algorithm based on their low rank parity-check
matrix. Roughly speaking, Algorithm 1 of [GMRZ13] decodes
up to d errors when rd ≤ n − k in polynomial time (see
[GMRZ13, Theorem 1]). It uses in a crucial way the notion
of the linear span of a product of subspaces of Fqm
Definition 5. Let U and V be two Fq subspaces of Fqm . We
denote by U · V the linear span of the product of U and V :
U · V := 〈uv : u ∈ U, v ∈ V 〉Fq .
III. THE EDON-K KEM
EDON-K [GG17] is a key encapsulation mechanism pro-
posed by Gligoroski and Gjøsteen for the NIST post-quantum
cryptography call. Here we describe the key generation, en-
capsulation and decapsulation, omitting some details that are
not relevant for the attack. We refer to [GG17] for the full
description.
A. Parameters and notations
The parameters for EDON-K are given in Table I. In this
paper we often refer to the parameters of edonk128ref, the
reference version proposed for 128 security-bits.
TABLE I
PARAMETERS PROPOSED FOR EDON-K
Name m N K R ν L
edonk128ref 128 144 16 40 8 6
edonk128K16N80nu8L6 128 80 16 40 8 6
edonk128K08N72nu8L8 128 72 8 40 8 8
edonk128K32N96nu4L4 128 96 32 40 4 4
edonk128K16N80nu4L6 128 80 16 40 4 6
edonk192ref 192 112 16 40 8 8
edonk192K48N144nu4L4 192 144 48 40 4 4
edonk192K32N128nu4L6 192 128 32 40 4 6
edonk192K16N112nu4L8 192 112 16 40 4 8
The scheme makes use of a hash function H (·) corre-
sponding to standard SHA2 functions (SHA-256 or SHA-
384 depending on the parameters). We will denote Hi(·) :=
H(. . .H(·))︸ ︷︷ ︸
i times
Given a binary matrix P = (pi,j) and two non-zero
elements a 6= b of F2m , Pa,b = (p˜i,j) denotes the matrix
of the same size with coefficients in F2m where p˜i,j = a if
pi,j = 0 and p˜i,j = b if pi,j = 1.
In particular, if P is orthogonal:
Pc,d
⊺ = (Pa,b)
−1 (1)
where c := a
a2+b2 and d :=
b
a2+b2 .
For two vectors (or matrices) x and y, we will denote x||y
their concatenation.
B. Key generation
Given the security level and the appropriate parameters.
• a, b
$
← F2m non-zero elememts such that a 6= b.
• P
$
← FN×N2 an orthogonal matrix.
• H
$
← FR×N2 such that H = [HT ||HB]
⊺
where HB is an
R × R orthogonal matrix and HT has columns of even
Hamming weight.
• c := a
a2+b2 , d :=
b
a2+b2 .
• g˜
$
← Fν2m .
• Vg := Support(g˜).
• G
$
← VK×Ng such that
GH⊺ = 0K×R. (2)
• Gpub := GPc,d
⊺.
• Return (PublicKey := Gpub, SecretKey := (a, b,P,H)).
C. Encapsulation
Given the PublicKey and the public parameters.
• m
$
← FK2m .
• e˜ ∈ FL2m generated as follows:
– (e˜0, e˜1)
$
← F2m ;
– for 1 ≤ i ≤ L2 − 1, (e˜2i, e˜2i+1) = H (e˜2i−2||e˜2i−1).
• Ve := Support(e˜).
• e
$
← VNe .
• c := mGpub + e.
• (s0, s1) := H (e˜L−2||e˜L−1).
• SharedSecret := H (s0||s1||H (c)).
• h := H (s1||so||H (c)).
• Ciphertext := (c, h).
• Return (Ciphertext, SharedSecret).
D. Decapsulation
Given Ciphertext, SecretKey and the public parameters.
• Recover e by decoding the c using the private matrix
H′ := HPa,b
⊺.
• Deduce Ve the vector space spaned by the coefficients of
the vector e.
• For all (λ, ν) ∈ Ve × Ve, for 1 ≤ i ≤
L
2 − 1:
– (s′0, s
′
1) := H
i (λ||µ||H (c));
– if H (s′1||s
′
0||c) = h:
Return SharedSecret := H (s′0||s
′
1||H (c)).
IV. OUTLINE OF THE ATTACK ON EDON-K
Our attack is based on three observations
• The ciphertext is a vector c such that
c = mGpub + e. (3)
This error e is of low rank, since its rank is at most L.
• This code Cpub generated by Gpub is a subcode of an
LRPC code, namely the code C′ with parity-check matrix
H′ := HPa,b
⊺. This code is indeed an LRPC code of
rank 2 since all the entries of H′ belong to 〈a, b〉
F2
. We
have
Cpub ⊂ C
′ (4)
since
GpubH
′⊺ = GPc,d
⊺(HPa,b
⊺)
⊺
= GPc,d
⊺Pa,bH
⊺
= GH⊺ (from (1))
= 0K×R (from (2)).
This equation also appears as Corollary 1 of [GG17,
p.19]. We have given its proof here for the convenience
of the reader. Let K ′ = N −R be the dimension of C′.
• If we recover a parity-check matrix of rank 2 for C′ we
will be able to recover mGpub and e from c. Indeed,
mGpub ∈ C
′ and we can decode C′ using a variation
of Algorithm 1 of [GMRZ13] and the knowledge of
the parity-check matrix, provided wt(e) ≤ L < (N −
K ′)/2 = R/2 is verified, which is the case for the
parameters of EDON-K.
Hence we will proceed in three steps:
1) constructing and solving a linear system of equations to
find a parity-check matrix for the code C′ (detailed in
Section V);
2) decoding the ciphertext using a slight variation of Algo-
rithm 1 of [GMRZ13] (see Section VI);
3) recovering the secret from the error vector (explained in
Section VII).
V. RECONSTRUCTING THE PARITY-CHECK MATRIX
A. Compressed public key
In order to reduce the public key size, the designers
of EDON-K chose to represent the public key in a com-
pressed form. They took advantage of the fact that all the
coefficients of Gpub live in the vector space Vg,c,d :=
〈cg˜1, . . . , cg˜ν , dg˜1, . . . , dg˜ν〉F2 of dimension 2ν. Hence, the
compressed public key consists in two parts: first the basis
g˜c,d := (cg˜1, . . . , cg˜ν, dg˜1, . . . , dg˜ν) ∈ F
2ν
2m of the vector-
space Vg,c,d, then the entries of the matrix Gpub such that
each entry is represented by its coefficients in the basis g˜c,d.
For example, if an entry x of Gpub is equal to c
∑ν
i=1 γig˜i +
d
∑ν
i=1 δig˜i with γi, δi ∈ F2, x will be represented by
(γ1, . . . , γν , δ1, . . . , δν) ∈ F
2ν
2 . There is another subtlety in
the compression that we will not mention here.
B. Finding a basis
The attacker does not have access to the value of a and b but
can deduce the value of ab−1 = cd−1 = (cg˜1)(dg˜1)
−1 from
g˜c,d as mentioned in paragraph 7.2.2 of the documentation of
EDON-K [GG17].
Let us bring in
α := ab−1.
We notice that H” := b−1H′ is also a parity-check matrix
of the LRPC code C′. This matrix has all its coefficients
in 〈1, α〉
F2
. We use this information to reconstruct such a
parity-check matrix of the code C′ by solving a linear system,
similarly to what is done in [GRS16, Section IV B]. This
system is derived from the following facts:
(i) Gpub H
′′⊺ = 0K×R;
(ii) the entries of H′′ belong to 〈1, α〉
F2
.
In other words, the possible rows x = (x1, . . . , xN ) of H
′′
are solutions of the following system{
Gpubx
⊺ = 0K
xi ∈ 〈1, α〉F2 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
(5)
This system is obviously linear over F2 and the solution set
is an F2-linear subspace. A basis of this subspace can then be
used as rows for H′′. We now show that solving this system
can be done by solving a linear system over F2.
C. Recovering H′′ by solving a linear system over F2 and an
affine system in a more general case
Actually in this section we will consider a more general
version of (5). Given a system
Ax⊺ = b⊺ (6)
where A = (aij)1≤i≤r,1≤j≤N is a given matrix in F
r×N
2m and b
is a given vector in Fr2m , and given V a subspace of dimension
t of F2m (viewed as vector space over F2 of dimension m),
how to find the affine set of the solutions x = (xi)1≤i≤N ∈
V N of the system?
We can rewrite the system (6) as

a11x1 + · · ·+ a1NxN = b1
· · · = · · ·
ar1x1 + · · ·+ arNxN = br.
(7)
We introduce a basis {v1, . . . , vt} of V and express each
unknown xj in this basis in terms of t other unknowns
xj1, . . . , xjt ∈ F2:
xj =
t∑
i=1
xjivi.
In other words, the system (6) is equivalent to

∑N
j=1
∑t
i=1 a1jvixji = b1
. . . = . . .∑N
j=1
∑t
i=1 arjvixji = br.
(8)
Let {β1, . . . , βm} be an F2-basis of F2m , we introduce for
1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m the projection πℓ from F2m to F2 defined by:
πℓ :
F2m −→ F2
a =
∑m
j=1 ajβj 7−→ aℓ.
(9)
The r equations of system (8) defined over F2m lead to rm
affine equations over F2 by applying πℓ for ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,m}:

∑N
j=1
∑t
i=1 πℓ(a1jvi)xji = πℓ(b1)
. . . = . . .∑N
j=1
∑t
i=1 πℓ(arjvi)xji = πℓ(br).
(10)
We can solve this affine system in F2 to recover the solution
of (6). The system has rm binary equations and tN unknowns,
hence a complexity of O(rmt2N2). If we apply this technique
to (5), where t = 2 and r = K we obtain a basis of the vector
space in time O(KmN2).
VI. DECODING STEP
The previous step recovers an R × N matrix H(3) whose
entries all belong to 〈1, α〉
F2
. The matrices H(3) and H′′ share
the property that their rows form a basis of solutions of (5).
Therefore, there exists an R × R binary invertible matrix Q
such that
H(3) = QH′′. (11)
We use H(3) to decode and recover e from the ciphertext
c. The vectors are linked by the equation
c = mGpub + e. (12)
We use here a slight variation of Algorithm 1 of [GMRZ13]
to decode. Algorithm 1 would consist in performing the
following steps:
1) Compute s⊺ := H(3)c⊺ and then V := Support(s). Here
we typically have V = Support(e) · 〈1, α〉Fq when H
(3)
is a random matrix.
2) Compute V ′ := V ∩α−1V . This step typically recovers
Support(e) when V = Support(e) · 〈1, α〉Fq .
3) Once we have Support(e) we recover e = (e1, . . . , eN )
by solving the linear equation H(3)e⊺ = s⊺ with the ad-
ditional constraints ei ∈ Support(e) for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
This is done by using the technique given in Subsection
V-C.
In our case, due to the special structure of H which contains
only a’s and b’s V is not equal to Support(e) · 〈1, α〉Fq . This
is due to the following result.
Proposition 1. We have for every e ∈ FN2m:
Support(H(3)e⊺) ⊂ (1 + α)Support(e) +
〈
N∑
i=1
ei
〉
F2
.
Proof. From (11), we deduce that
Support(H(3)e⊺) = Support(QH′′e⊺) = Support(H′′e⊺).
Let s⊺ := H′′e⊺. Denote the i-entry of s by si and the entry
of H′′ in row i and column j by h′′ij . We have:
si =
N∑
j=1
h′′ijej
=
∑
j s.t. h′′
ij
=1
ej +
∑
j s.t. h′′
ij
=α
αej
=
N∑
j=1
ej + (1 + α)
∑
j s.t. h′′
ij
=α
ej .
This implies the proposition.
This proposition directly gives a subspace of dimension
L+ 1 that contains Support(e) since we deduce from it that
Support(e) ⊂ (1 + α)−1Support(H′′e). (13)
A slight modication of Algorithm 1 of [GMRZ13] yields
therefore e:
1) compute the syndrome s⊺ := H(3)c⊺ and then V :=
(1 + α)−1Support(s);
2) The space V contains Support(e), so we can re-
cover e = (e1, . . . , eN ) by solving the linear equation
H(3)e⊺ = s⊺ with the additional constraints ei ∈ V for
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. This is done by using the technique
given in Subsection V-C.
Note that we can also skip step 2 and directly look for s0
and s1 in the space V of dimension L+1 instead of decoding
exactly the value of e. In fact, this is what is specified in the
decapsulation of EDON-K.
VII. RECOVERING THE SHARED SECRET
Once we have recovered the error vector e ∈ FNqm , we need
to recover s0 and s1 to obtain the value of SharedSecret.
We know that the elements of e were picked randomly in
Ve = Support(e˜).We proceed just like in the decapsulation
algorithm.
We generate Support(e) which is equal to Ve with high
probability. More exactly, the probability that Support(e) is of
dimension < L is
(
L−1
L
)N
. For the parameters of edonk128ref
this probability is 2−37. In such a case, the attack might fail,
but the decapsulation would fail too.
Then, among the 2L elements of Ve, we need to identify a
couple of consecutive elements of e˜ to deduce the secret. For
all pairs of candidates (λ, µ) ∈ Ve × Ve, for 1 ≤ i ≤
L
2 − 1
we compute (s′0, s
′
1) := H
i (λ||µ||H (c)). If H (s′1||s
′
0||c) = h
then we have (s′0, s
′
1) = (s0, s1). Finally we recover the secret
SharedSecret = H (s0||s1||c). In total this operation requires
O(L22L) operations, just like the decapsulation. This is the
reason why the value of L needs to remain small, otherwise
the decapsulation is not possible.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
A. Cost of the attack
Let us analyze the cost of the three steps of the attack
mentioned in Section IV.
Step 1 and 2 are polynomial in terms of the parameters
of the code. Step 1 only uses linear algebra operations and
has a complexity at most O(KmN2). The complexity of
step 2 is given by Theorem 1 of [GMRZ13] (using n =
N, k = N − R, r = L and d = 2), hence is equal to
L2(16m + N2). The complexity of step 3 is O(L22L). This
is not polynomial in L but L is a very small parameter
(4 ≤ L ≤ 8 in the proposal). Moreover this third step is
the same as the decapsulation algorithm, so L needs to stay
small, otherwise the decapsulation would become too costly or
even impossible. So L can be considered as a constant ≤ 10
to allow a reasonable decapsulation. Hence the most costly
operation appears to be step 1.
B. Without compression of the public key
Our attack takes advantage of the compressed form of the
public key that allows a direct access to the value α = ab−1.
One could think that this is the origin of the attack, and decide
to express the public key in its uncompressed form to fix the
attack. As a consequence, the public key would be of size
K×N ×m bits instead of K×N × ν bits in the compressed
form. In practice the public key for edonk128ref would be 16
times longer (around 288 kbits). This inflation of the key size
could be avoided by sending out a random basis of the space
Vg,c,d.
However, this is not enough. There is an even more direct
way to proceed, without the value of α. Instead of looking for
a matrix H(3) with entries liyng in 〈1, α〉
F2
, we can use the
following result.
Proposition 2. There exists a full rank (R − 1) × N binary
matrix H(4) that satisfies
GpubH
(4)⊺ = 0K×(R−1).
Proof. Let T be a binary full-rank matrix (R− 1)×R matrix
that has rows of even Hamming weight. For instance we can
choose
T =


1 1 0 · · · 0
0 1 1 0
...
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 1 1

 .
We observe now that TH has all its entries in {0, a+ b}.
This follows directly from the fact that if we sum an even
number of elements in {a, b} we either get 0 (if the number
of a’s is even, and therefore also the number of b’s) or a+b (if
the number of a’s is odd). From this, it follows immediately
that
H(4) :=
1
a+ b
TH
satisties the property. First, it is clear that this is a binary
matrix and we also have
GpubH
(4)⊺ =
1
a+ b
GpubH
⊺T⊺
= 0K×(R−1).
Obtaining such a matrix H(4) is straightforward. We just
have to use the algorithm given in Section V to recover a
basis of dimension R− 1 of binary vectors x satisfying
Gpubx
⊺ = 0K .
We then use this matrix H(4) to compute the syndrome
s = H(4)c⊺. Since H(4)c⊺ = H(4)e⊺ we directly obtain with
very high probability that
Support(e) = Support(H(4)c⊺).
This reveals the support of the error and from there we can
go directly to the last step of the attack to reconstruct the
shared secret.
C. Security of the scheme
Considering the attack that we described, there is a way to
recover the secret of the edonk128ref scheme from a public
key without the private key in polynomial time. In practice, the
attack implemented with Sage on a personal computer recovers
the secret in less than a minute, so the scheme is far from
achieving the 128-bits security claimed in [GG17]. Hence this
scheme is insecure for the intended use. Moreover, the cost of
this attack is polynomial in terms of the parameters, so there
is no proper way to increase the parameters to achieve the
intended security level while keeping a reasonably small key
size.
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